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The Conservatism Principle and
Asymmetric Preferences Over Reporting Errors

December 22, 2020

ABSTRACT: At present, accounting conservatism is generally viewed from a measurement or
reporting perspective. In contrast, we consider whether it relates to a moral rule of conduct.
Conservatism has been described as deriving from a preference for reporting errors to be in the
direction of understatement rather than overstatement. We experimentally pair Reporters who
provide information with Users who rely on the information. We posit that under misaligned
incentives that motivate aggressive reporting, Users view an aggressive report as reflecting
Reporters’ exploitative intent and expect that a social norm prohibiting aggressive reporting
applies. We predict that Users use noisy reporting errors to gauge Reporters’ norm compliance.
Consistent with this we find that, ceteris paribus, Users prefer not to be paired with Reporters who
produce overstatement errors that are likely to reflect aggressive reporting. This preference,
revealed through Users’ incentivized actions, is both inconsistent with neoclassical economic
models and cannot be explained by loss aversion. Alternatively, when Reporters’ motives are
aligned with Users’, we find no such preference. While our evidence is indirect, it opens the
possibility that conservatism emerged from a norm that enhances trust and cooperation among
economic agents. We believe this insight can open new possibilities for conservatism research.
Keywords: accounting conservatism; experimental economics; intentions; moral hazard
JEL Codes: B52, D81, D82, M41

1. INTRODUCTION
Societies adapt practices such as honesty, integrity, and reliability into informal rules –
social norms – that restrict the flexibility of individual choices in order to promote cooperative
activity and increase economic efficiency (North 2005). While conservatism has been a feature
of accounting systems for at least five hundred years (Littleton 1941), scholars’ current
explanations for its presence largely require features of modern economies such as formal
contracts and government regulation (Watts 2003a). In contrast, we consider whether
conservatism emerged from the practices societies adopted to promote cooperative activity in the
period before the development of formal institutions (Smith 2008; Dickhaut et al. 2010).
Imagine a nascent relationship between a farmer and a baker in which the farmer reports
their estimated crop yield to the baker, who then plans their productive capacity. When realized,
the farmer sells as much of their yield to the baker as the baker can use. While the farmer prefers
that the baker build greater capacity, the baker incurs costs for both insufficient and unused
capacity. Say that in one possible instance the farmer reports seven bushels and the actual yield
is five bushels – while in another instance the farmer reports three bushels, and the yield is five
bushels. Even if ex ante honest estimates of seven bushels and three bushels are equally likely to
result in a yield of five bushels, given the underlying moral hazard – the farmer’s incentive to
overstate their report to try to induce the baker to build greater capacity – ex post, it is more
likely the baker was exploited if the report was seven bushels than three. Sanders et al. (1938)
describe conservatism by stating that “[t]here is a prevalent assumption that, while
overstatement…is a major fault, understatement…may be a positive virtue.” We propose that
this relative preference for understatement versus overstatement arises when people are
vulnerable to exploitation via aggressive reporting, as the baker is vulnerable to the farmer.
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We design an experiment that tests for this preference and which isolates our proposed
‘moral hazard’ mechanism. In our setting, a Reporter develops an informed, private estimate of
their outcome for the period and sends a report to the User, who takes an action that relies on the
report. The realized outcome is then publicly revealed, and each party’s payoffs are disclosed.
Similar to the farmer (Reporter) communicating his expected yield to the baker (User), the
User’s payoff is maximized when their action (e.g., capacity choice) exactly meets the realized
outcome (e.g., farmer’s yield), and the User incurs symmetric costs for actions greater than and
less than the outcome. We manipulate the Reporter’s payoff in a 1 x 2 between-subjects design.
In the Aligned treatment, the Reporter’s payoff is also maximized when the User’s action is equal
to the realized outcome. In the Misaligned treatment, the Reporter’s payoff is maximized when
the User’s action is greater than the outcome – so while Reporters are motivated to report
aggressively to try to deceive the User and induce greater action (e.g., to build larger capacity),
Users are motivated to anticipate and avoid such exploitation. The Reporter’s motivation has
many real-world analogues, including the entrepreneur’s inherent optimistic bias (e.g., Devine
1963; Sterling 1967) and, in modern times, corporate managers’ incentives to overstate reported
outcomes in the presence of various agency conflicts (Kothari et al. 2010).
We group six Reporters and six Users who interact in pairs for ten periods. At the start of
each period, we provide Users with graphs that display each Reporters’ full history of reporting
errors, and we ask Users to rank the Reporters in the order they prefer to be paired. We then
randomly select Users and pair each with their highest-ranked Reporter that has yet to be paired.
As the rankings drive next period’s pairings, they reveal Users’ preferences over Reporters.
Consider the Misaligned treatment, which is characterized by (i) information asymmetry,
(ii) measurement uncertainty, and (iii) misaligned incentives that motivate aggressive reporting.
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The first two characteristics create a focus on the Reporters’ ex post reporting error (i.e., whether
the report over- or understated the realization), as this is all the Users observe. Since Users can
strategically discount any predictable bias in the Reporter’s history, Users should prefer
consistent reporting errors. Further, if they are solely motivated by their own payoff, they should
have no preference over the sign of the reporting errors. However, prior research shows that
people consider how their counterpart’s payoffs affect the intentions behind their actions (e.g.,
McCabe et al. 2003; Sutter 2007). In light of the Reporter’s motive, from the perspective of the
User the greater the reporting error, the more likely it is that the Reporter had exploitative intent.
We posit that Users view exploitation via aggressive reporting as violating an informal rule and,
as such, their trust in a Reporter corresponds to their assessed probability of being exploited
(Yamagishi 1998). We therefore predict that, ceteris paribus, Users disprefer (i.e., prefer not to
be paired with) Reporters who produce errors that are likely to reflect aggressive reporting.
We test this hypothesis by regressing the Users’ preference rankings in the Misaligned
treatment on attributes of each Reporter’s error history in an ordered logit model. We expect and
find that Users prefer Reporters with consistent and accurate reporting errors. Controlling for
these factors, the results support our predictions. First, the decline in Users’ rankings is larger
for Reporters who produce a large overstatement error compared to those who produce an
understatement error of equal magnitude, indicating that Users disprefer Reporters who are most
likely to have reported aggressively. Second, the decline in Users’ rankings is larger for
Reporters who produce an incremental overstatement error than an incremental understatement
error. This indicates that, in the presence of measurement error, Reporters are likely to face
greater sanctioning for an aggressive report than for a conservative one.
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Next, we predict that Users’ apparent dispreference for aggressive reporting is driven by
the Reporters’ motivation to report aggressively. We test this hypothesis in an ordered logit
model with data from both treatments, and test for difference-in-differences: that Users’
asymmetric preferences for reporting errors are larger when incentives are misaligned than when
aligned. The results support our predictions, as we do not observe asymmetric preferences in the
Aligned treatment as we do in the Misaligned treatment. For example, after controlling for the
effect errors have on the consistency and accuracy of reports, we find that an incremental error –
both over- and understated – has no significant effect on Users’ rankings in the Aligned
treatment. Similarly, an incremental understatement error has no significant effect on rankings
in the Misaligned treatment. That is, in those circumstances there are no factors outside of
consistency and accuracy that lead Users to disprefer larger magnitude errors. But when
Reporters are motivated to report aggressively, an incremental overstatement error is associated
with a significant decline in their average rank. That is, there is some additional factor leading
Users to disprefer larger magnitude overstatement errors when incentives are misaligned.
After the final round of the experiment, we ask Users to identify each Reporter as one
they either “trust” or “don’t trust.” We then ask Users to predict which Reporters other Users
said they trust, and we provide a payment for each correct prediction. Analysis from a logit
regression indicates that, ceteris paribus, Users in the Misaligned treatment are more than twice
as likely to indicate trust in a Reporter whose aggregate reporting error is negative, and are
significantly more likely to report trust in a Reporter whose aggregate reporting error is in the
bottom quartile than the top quartile. Further, Users are significantly more likely to believe that
other Users report more trust in ‘understated’ than ‘overstated’ Reporters. This is consistent with
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Users perceiving a shared understanding regarding the link between the direction of reporting
errors and Reporters’ underlying intentions in light of their motive to report aggressively.
In a setting featuring three realistic characteristics, we demonstrate that Users disprefer
Reporters who produce reporting errors that are likely to reflect aggressive reporting. The
preference is inconsistent with strategic self-interested behavior derived from neoclassical
economic theory, however, consistent with prior research we infer the preference reflects Users’
expectations that aggressive reporting violates an informal rule (e.g., Hobson et al. 2011). While
this is a prerequisite for a social norm, we do not observe the activation of a norm (Bicchieri
2006) because a social norm requires agreement between Users’ normative expectations and
Reporters’ beliefs about them (Bicchieri and Chavez 2010, 166). However, in Users’ normative
expectations we demonstrate a necessary initial condition. As such, we explore how reporting
might evolve in the presence of this condition.
Consider a social exchange economy in which Users view aggressive reporting as
exploitative. Through communication and repeat interaction within the society, a common
understanding can emerge that aggressive reporting violates a social norm. If so, then a Reporter
who has produced overstatement errors can develop a reputation for exploitation and, through
direct and indirect reciprocity, may lose subsequent exchange opportunities. By choosing to
report more conservatively, the Reporter can expect to reduce their overstatement errors. Doing
so can help indicate their good intentions, which, over time, can repair their reputation,
strengthen relationships with exchange partners, and facilitate ongoing exchange. That is,
conservatism can emerge as an informal bonding cost, borne by the Reporter, that arises
endogenously through repeat interaction and that serves to minimize ‘contracting’ losses arising
from information asymmetry (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Ball et al. 2000).
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Importantly, while contracting-based conservatism studies generally assume that external
parties have asymmetric payoffs to the firm’s performance – that they face greater exposure to
downside risk (e.g., Hui et al. 2012) – our mechanism does not require this feature. As such, we
employ experimental methodology to provide a novel mechanism from which the contracting
basis for conservatism can emerge, thereby connecting our findings with the broader empirical
literature (Watts 2003a, 2003b). Further, because Reporters in our setting do not face good news
or bad news conditions and do not report gains or losses, our findings can be generalized to
settings beyond those that are the primary focus of our current literature (Basu 1997).
We do not suggest that our moral hazard mechanism excludes other fundamental
explanations (e.g., Basu and Waymire 2017), but rather that it adds another element of an
evolutionary process. However, one distinguishing feature of ours relative to some others (e.g.,
Hirshleifer and Teoh 2009; Braun 2016) is that the preferences revealed in our study are not
driven by loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). That said, we believe that the moral
hazard and loss aversion mechanisms supplement each other in driving these preferences in the
real world as, in many common instances, a User will view an ex post overstatement error as a
loss (an ‘under-realization’) and an understatement error as a gain (an ‘over-realization’).
In summary, we believe our research adds to traditional explanations of conservatism.
The Accounting Principles Board described conservatism as deriving from a general preference
for reporting errors to be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement (APB
1970, para 171). We propose that this behavior may have evolved from practices that enhance
trust and cooperation within social exchange economies. As this regards prehistoric human
behavior, we employ experimental economics methodology to test the idea in an abstract, lowcontext setting. Sterling (1967, 110) describes conservatism as “the most ancient and probably
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the most pervasive principle of accounting valuation.” Others have suggested that conservatism
may reflect an ‘innate’ or ‘inborn’ tendency (Hill and Gordon 1959, 170; Staubus 1996, 73). We
provide evidence consistent with an underlying cause of conservatism that explains its historical
roots and helps explain why many scholars have come to view the behavior as innate. We
believe this can open interesting new possibilities for conservatism research.
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Literature review
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has defined conservatism as “a
prudent reaction to uncertainty…. if two estimates…are equally likely, conservatism dictates
using the less optimistic estimate” (FASB 1980, para 95). Indeed, conservatism evolved from
the prudence concept, originally considered a moral virtue conducive to honesty and competence
in business (Maltby 2000).1 Chatfield (1977, 11) notes that the principle of conservatism was
reflected in a Greek accounting system in the fifth century BC. Basu (2009, 12) cites
fragmentary evidence of conservatism in 60 A.D. Conservatism has been observed in emergent
accounting systems from Germany (Harris et al. 1994) to Japan (Someya 1996). Scholars’ most
common explanations for its presence are that it: (i) addresses moral hazard concerns of external
(contracting) parties; (ii) reduces shareholder litigation; (iii) reduces the costs of taxation; and
(iv) reduces the political costs imposed on accounting regulators (Watts 2003a). While the latter
three explanations require features of modern economies – e.g., government structures that allow
for corporations, taxation, and regulators – the contracting explanation may have historical roots.

1

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith states that the prudent person “is always sincere, and feels horror
at the very thought of exposing himself to the disgrace which attends upon the detection of falsehood” (Smith
1790/2011, 215). To the extent ex post overstatement errors are viewed as a reflection of ex ante dishonesty, this
description indicates that a prudent Reporter will report conservatively in the presence of measurement error.
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Studies supporting the contracting explanation often focus on counterparties’ asymmetric
payoffs with respect to firm financial performance, as strong performance does not increase their
payoff while weak performance decreases it (Ruch and Taylor 2015). For example, Qiang
(2007) finds that firms facing higher contracting costs choose conditionally rather than
unconditionally conservative accounting.2 Focusing on debt contracting, Ahmed et al. (2002)
and Zhang (2008) find that conservatism reduces firms’ debt costs, while Wittenberg-Moerman
(2008) finds evidence consistent with it decreasing a borrower’s information asymmetry.
Ball et al. (2000) find that conservatism is greater in common-law countries, concluding
that information asymmetry is more likely resolved in code-law countries by other institutional
features. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that UK private firms, who are more likely to resolve
information asymmetry through an ‘insider access’ model, report less conservatively than do
public firms. LaFond and Watts (2008) focus on the manager’s asymmetric payoffs to reporting
(stronger incentives to over- than understate performance) and find evidence consistent with
conservatism decreasing information asymmetry between a firm and its outside equity investors.
Analytical models have also shown possible reasons why conservative accounting
measurement affects labor or debt contracting (e.g., Gigler and Hemmer 2001; Bagnoli and
Watts 2005; Gigler et al. 2009; Göx and Wagenhofer 2009; Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan
2012; Gao 2013; Nagar et al. 2018). In these models, a conservative choice pertains to the initial
design of the accounting measurement system – that is, it is a property of the measurement
system rather than of the preparer’s reporting choices.

2

Conditional conservatism occurs when negative economic news is recognized in accounting earnings in a timelier
manner than positive economic news, while unconditional conservatism occurs through the consistent underrecognition of accounting net assets (Ruch and Taylor 2015).
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In sum, historical evidence suggests that there must be fundamental reasons behind the
development of accounting conservatism, while the empirical literature highlights some core
factors that might contribute to such development, including (i) information asymmetry between
preparers and users of reports and (ii) preparers’ incentives to overstate reports. Further, whereas
the theoretical literature has primarily focused on conservatism as a measurement issue, we
consider whether conservatism was adapted from a rule of conduct.
2.2 Background
In early civilizations, during the transition from “maker to manufacturer” (Rosenberg
1994), humans faced a choice either to be self-sufficient or to specialize in producing a limited
number of goods. Specialization is risky if an individual cannot find and retain trading partners,
and relationships with trading partners can fall apart if there are barriers to the emergence of trust
(Crockett et al. 2009). In an environment preceding legal protection of property rights – and
preceding institutions that enable formal monitoring and bonding activities (Jensen and Meckling
1976) – trust yields implicit ‘contracts’ that are self-enforced by the parties through repeat
interaction (Fehr et al. 1997; Kimbrough et al. 2008).
Social norms are shared, informal understandings about actions that are obligatory,
permitted, or forbidden (Ostrom 2000). Smith (2008, 161-163) suggests that long histories of
social interaction promote norms that support specialization and enhance wealth. For example,
the Golden Rule, “do unto others as you would have others do unto you,” encourages
cooperation in small-scale social economies. If, for instance, enough individuals within a society
believe that some behavior is inappropriate, those refraining from the conduct face lower
transaction costs than those continuing it and, over time, the emergent practice becomes
entrenched as a social norm (Smith 2003, 484). We conjecture that, in a similar fashion,
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accounting conservatism emerged from a social norm to help build the trust and cooperation
necessary to promote specialization and exchange in small-scale social economies.3
2.3 Setting
Imagine a social exchange economy comprised of Reporters and Users who can choose
to enter into informal agreements to exchange with one another. If they agree to exchange, the
Reporter develops an informed estimate of their demand for the period and sends a report to the
User, who takes an action that relies on the report. Inherent to this process is information
asymmetry, as the Reporter’s best estimate reflects their private information, and measurement
uncertainty, because they cannot perfectly estimate future demand. One example of this process
is that customers communicate nonbinding expectations about demand to suppliers, who can
plan their productive capacity based upon these reports (Özer et al. 2011).
Once realized, the demand is publicly known. The User’s payoff is maximized when
their action equals the realized demand, and they incur symmetric costs if their action overstates
or understates the realization. However, the Reporter’s payoff is maximized when the User’s
action exceeds the demand; as such, if the User naively trusts the report, the Reporter has shortterm incentives to report aggressively to encourage greater action.4 For example, to ensure
abundant supply a customer may inflate their estimated demand to try to induce their supplier to
build larger capacity, while the supplier faces costs for both insufficient and unused capacity.
Another factor inherent to this setting is ambiguity (i.e., Knightian uncertainty), as neither
party has complete knowledge of the degree of measurement uncertainty. That is, there is no
3

Our focus is on social exchange because, while organisms likely evolved to respond ‘conservatively’ to stimuli
before humans engaged in exchange (e.g., fleeing from a strong negative signal, even an uncertain one, as a
naturally-selected survival instinct), this does not directly speak to modern accounting, whose fundamental demand
is to help guide exchange (Waymire 2009).
4
This structure also resembles modern economies, which are effectively a series of cooperative games between
firms and their (i) customers, (ii) suppliers, (iii) debtholders, and (iv) equity holders, where the firm faces incentives
to report optimistically, and where inaccurate reports can impose costs on others.
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verification mechanism, as there are no combinations of report and realization for which the User
can be certain the Reporter did not provide their best estimate. Indeed, even if a Reporter
provides a report that understates their best estimate, they can still overestimate the realized
demand – so, while overstatement errors may be the result of aggressive reporting, the User
cannot be certain this is the case. This ambiguity is a key feature of our setting, as Heiner (1983)
notes that social norms arise because of uncertainty in distinguishing preferred from lesspreferred behavior on each individual action.
As the only evidence available to guide future interactions is the ex post reporting error
(i.e., the report minus the realized demand), the parties’ focus is on this figure. Communication
within the economy can create common knowledge about each Reporter’s history of reporting
errors. To the extent Users have normative expectations regarding Reporters’ behavior, they can
use their common knowledge to enact positive and negative sanctions (reward and punishment)
against Reporters based on their norm compliance (Bicchieri 2006).
2.4 Hypotheses
Our expectation is that Users will examine each Reporter’s behavior for signs that they
are trustworthy. Trust arises when there is interdependence between parties (Rousseau et al.
1998). In our setting, the User must rely on the Reporter’s report to guide their chosen action,
which directly affects both parties’ payoff. Trust also arises when there is uncertainty regarding
(i) the counterpart’s intentions (Rousseau et al. 1998) and (ii) the outcome of the interaction
(Heimer 2001). The latter is created in our setting by measurement uncertainty. The former is
created in part by information asymmetry and enhanced by the incentive misalignment inherent
in the payoff structures, which creates substantial uncertainty about the Reporter’s intentions.
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Rabin (1993) highlighted the role of intentions in shaping attitudes – that people judge
others not only on the consequences of their actions, but also according to their motives.5 In our
setting, to the extent aggressive reporting leads to aggressive action (i.e., the User is deceived),
an aggressive report, in expectation, both effects a wealth transfer from User to Reporter and
reduces social welfare. As social norms generally apply to situations in which there is a conflict
between selfish and pro-social incentives, the payoff structures may serve as a cue that the
situation is one in which a norm applies (Bicchieri 2006). To the extent Users consider
Reporters’ motives, they may view aggressive reporting as an exploitation attempt intended to
achieve a selfish outcome. Therefore, we posit that Users will perceive a social norm to apply in
this situation: an informal rule prohibiting aggressive reporting.
If Users view aggressive reporting as violating a social norm, how can they gauge
Reporter’s compliance? Because the User does not observe the Reporter’s private signal, they
cannot determine whether a given report is aggressively biased (i.e., whether the report is greater
than the signal). Rather, the User only observes reporting errors when the state of nature is
revealed at the end of the period, after they have chosen their action. Therefore, we posit that
Users will use noisy reporting errors to gauge Reporters’ compliance with the social norm.
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, Users disprefer Reporters producing reporting
errors that are likely to reflect aggressive reporting.
Hypothesis 2: Users’ dispreference for reporting errors likely to reflect aggressive
reporting is driven by the Reporters’ motivation to report aggressively.

5
Intention-based approaches have since reconciled previously unexplained empirical findings across a large range
of economic games (e.g., see McCabe et al. 2003; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Falk et al. 2008). Other studies have
focused on participants’ preferences over outcomes (e.g., Levine 1998; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000). In our setting, the Reporter’s report does not directly affect the User’s payoff, which is a function
of the User’s action and a state of nature. Therefore, any User’s preference over reporting outcomes must
necessarily relate to their reading of the Reporter’s intention rather than to the report itself.
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
3.1 Overview of experiment
We construct a multi-period information transmission game that pairs Reporters and
Users in communities that consist of six Reporters and six Users apiece. They interact in pairs
for ten periods, with new pairings each period. The Reporter receives a noisy private signal of
the state of nature and prepares a report for the User. That the signal is noisy and private
operationalizes measurement uncertainty and information asymmetry, respectively.6 While the
Reporter prepares their report, the User decides whether they want to interact with the paired
Reporter in that period. If the User opts out, both parties receive a fixed payment. If the User
opts in, they receive the report and choose their action. The state of nature, action, and realized
payoffs are then revealed to both agents, and the period ends.
The report, action, and state of nature are integers with range one to ten. The signal is an
integer between three through eight, each with equal probability. The state of nature is equal to
the signal plus an error term from the set {–2, –1, 0, 1, 2}, with the following odds: –2 (1/7), –1
(3/14), 0 (2/7), +1 (3/14), +2 (1/7). We choose this distribution because it provides significant
measurement uncertainty while maintaining a sufficient degree of information in the signal, as
the expected value of the absolute value of the error equals one. Notably, we inform the parties
only that (i) the signal is equal to the expected value of the state of nature in each period and (ii)
the state of nature is equally likely to be greater than or less than the signal. That is, to
operationalize ambiguity we do not inform them of any other details of either distribution, thus
eliminating the User’s ability to verify – even ex post – whether any report was biased.

6

The Accounting Principles Board description of conservatism, provided on page six, emphasizes the role of
measurement uncertainty. Other definitions are similar, e.g. Gilman (1939, 130): “…in case of doubt income should
be excluded…while in case of doubt costs, expenses, or losses should be included.” (emphasis added)
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Reporter-User pairings in the first period are determined at random. Starting with the
second period, each period Users review Reporters’ histories of reporting errors and rank every
Reporter in the order they prefer to be paired. We then randomly select Users and pair each with
their highest ranked unpaired Reporter – that is, the User selecting first is paired with their most
preferred Reporter, the User selecting second is paired with their highest-ranking unpaired
Reporter, and so on, until the User selecting sixth is paired with the remaining unpaired Reporter.
To operationalize sanctioning, Reporters receive a bonus adjustment to their payoff based on
how early they are selected, as follows: #1 (+$4), #2 (+$3), #3 ($0), #4 ($0), #5 (–$3), #6 (–$4).
We then notify each Reporter of both their selection position and their average ranking in the
period among all Users. Each period, we also notify Users of where they ranked the Reporter
they are paired with and we ask them if they want to interact with the Reporter or be selfsufficient. If they choose self-sufficiency, both parties receive a payoff of $5.
Lastly, we use these rankings to measure Users’ preferences over Reporters for our
hypothesis tests. The rankings reveal User preferences because they directly determine the next
period’s pairings (i.e., how Users ‘acquire’ their preferred Reporter), and Users cannot
strategically “game” the process by not telling the truth (i.e., the mechanism is incentivecompatible).
3.2 Misaligned treatment: Hypothesis 1
The payoffs for each party in the Misaligned treatment are presented in Panel A of Table
1. The payoffs are based on Crawford and Sobel (1982), which have been used as the basis for
prior theoretical and experimental research (Dickhaut et al. 1995; Cain et al. 2005; Koch and
Schmidt 2010; Qu 2013). While the User’s payoff is maximized when the action equals the state
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of nature and they incur a symmetric cost if their action is greater than or less than the state of
nature, the Reporter’s payoff is maximized when the action exceeds the state of nature by 3.7
[insert Table 1 about here]
Because both parties’ payoffs are driven by the difference between the action and the
realized state of nature – and not by the absolute level of the realized state – signals contain
neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ news, and reports represent neither gains nor losses.8 Further, when the
action is equal to the signal in the Misaligned treatment, the payoffs provide for (i) an expected
Users’ payoff equal to the expected Reporters’ payoff and (ii) maximization of the total expected
payoff. As such, an aggressive report that induces an aggressive action will, in expectation, both
transfer wealth from the User to the Reporter and reduce total welfare. The welfare loss arises
because the wealth transferred from the User ($5 per unit) significantly exceeds the wealth
transferred to the Reporter ($1 per unit).
We test hypothesis 1 within the Misaligned treatment. Hypothesis 1 predicts that Users
disprefer Reporters producing reporting errors that are likely to reflect aggressive reporting. If
so, they will disprefer a large overstatement to a large understatement error of equal magnitude.
In addition, Users will view each incremental overstatement error – but not each incremental
understatement error – as indicating a higher probability of noncompliance. Therefore, we test
H1 via two discrete predictions: that, ceteris paribus, Users disprefer to be paired with Reporters

7

Users likely view the report – the number on which they base their action – as a reference point against which they
compare the realized state. However, because of the nature of their payoffs, Users experience only neutral changes
(when the state equals the report/reference point) and losses (when the state differs from the report, causing their
payoff to decrease). That is, when comparing the realized state to the report, they do not experience any gains. As
such, there is no apparent role for loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) to affect User preferences.
8
Because we employ an abstract, low-context setting in line with the experimental economics paradigm, we employ
a parsimonious design that focuses on the core elements inherent to our setting and we do not operationalize every
facet (Davis and Holt 1993). For example, in our conceptualized setting (section 2.3) Reporters and Users engage in
economic exchange. We simplify this, so the state of nature is a number and the action is a guess about the number.
Further, we simplify the Reporter’s payoff (so it is driven by a constant difference between the action and the state
of nature) to focus on the core element that the Reporter prefers a greater action than the User.
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who produce (H1a) a large overstatement error than an understatement error of equal magnitude
(our ‘level of error’ prediction) and (H1b) an incremental overstatement error than an
incremental understatement error (our ‘change in error’ prediction).
3.3 Aligned treatment: Hypothesis 2
To test hypothesis 2, we utilize a between-subjects design and manipulate the Reporter’s
incentive to overstate their report.9 Specifically, we create an Aligned treatment in which both
parties’ payoff is maximized when the action equals the state of nature. The payoffs for the
Aligned treatment are included in Panel B of Table 1. A comparison of Panels A and B reveals
that we merely shift the Reporter’s payoff structure by three units across treatments. This
represents the only factor that we manipulate between treatments.
We test hypothesis 2 by measuring preferences of Users in both treatments. Hypothesis 2
predicts that Users’ apparent dispreference for aggressive reporting is driven by the Reporters’
motivation to report aggressively. Following H1, we test H2 via two discrete predictions: that,
ceteris paribus, Users’ dispreference to be paired with Reporters who produce (H2a) a large
overstatement error than understatement error of equal magnitude and (H2b) an incremental
overstatement than understatement error is larger in the Misaligned than the Aligned treatment.
3.4 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted at a medium-sized private university in a dedicated
experimental economics laboratory. A total of 192 participants were recruited from a participant
pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students with each being randomly assigned to a

9
We manipulate only one of the three key characteristics of our setting – the Reporter’s motive – as we view the
effects of the others to be self-evident. In the absence of measurement uncertainty, ex post Users can perfectly infer
any bias in the report. In the absence of information asymmetry, the User can plan their action based on the signal
itself, so the report is unnecessary. While different levels of these parameters may have less-clear effects (e.g., see
Abdel-Rahim and Stevens (2018) regarding a reduction in the level of information asymmetry), we leave these
considerations for future research.
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single session. There were four sessions of both treatments, with each session containing 24
participants. Each session was performed with two ‘communities’ in the room at the same time,
providing a sample of 48 Reporters and 48 Users in each treatment.10 In all treatments the
experiment lasted ten periods and participants were aware of this in advance.11 While ReporterUser pairs in each community received different stochastically-generated signals and states of
nature, we used the same set of signals and states for each treatment so that variation in outcomes
is due to variation in participant behavior.
Each session lasted approximately one hour and was sequenced as follows. Participants
were seated at visually isolated workstations and interacted with each other anonymously over a
local computer network. Each participant first read the instructions on their computer. The
instructions explain the experimental procedures and payoffs; see Appendix 1 for the instructions
for the Misaligned treatment. Participants then answered quiz questions on their computer about
the instructions (see Appendix 2 for the quiz for the Misaligned treatment), where each question
was repeated until the participants selected the correct answer. The experimenter privately
answered any questions regarding the experimental procedures. This phase took approximately
half an hour. In the second phase each participant was assigned a role (labeled as ‘sender’ or
‘receiver’) and remained in that role for the entire experiment. We described the roles and
actions to participants using neutral terms to minimize the possibility of subjects making implicit
assumptions about behavior (Haynes and Kachelmeier 1998).

10

The authors’ institutions obtained Internal Review Board (IRB) approval for this experiment, which requires that
they not use deception.
11
As Users do not rank Reporters after the tenth period, our hypothesis tests are unaffected by end-game effects. In
untabulated results we do find end-game effects in the reports and actions in the Misaligned treatment. Specifically,
reports in the final period are more aggressive and, anticipating this, Users discount the reports to a greater degree,
so the net result is that investment efficiency (i.e., action minus the signal) in the final period is unchanged.
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Each participant was paid a $7 participation fee in addition to their payoffs from (i) one
randomly selected period, (ii) an incentivized belief elicitation task on Reporter trustworthiness
(see section 4.4), and (iii) a risk assessment measure (see Appendix 3). Lastly, while payments
were processed participants were asked demographic information (e.g., age, gender) and filled
out the Short Dark Triad (SD3) personality trait survey (Jones and Paulhus 2014). On average
participants earned $19.50 in addition to their participation fee.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the overall game results are included in Table 2. They
demonstrate that under misaligned incentives, on average Reporters aggressively bias their
reports (0.47 in Panel A). Further, this reporting bias is significantly larger in the Misaligned
than Aligned treatment, thereby validating our manipulation. Users effectively discount most of
this bias in their action (see Action Bias and Action Efficiency). The self-sufficiency option is
rarely used in either treatment (under 3% in both Panels A and B); further, no individual User
selected self-sufficiency more than twice and no Reporter had the option imposed on them more
than twice (untabulated). Reporters out-earn Users in both treatments, and both parties’ payoff is
maximized when their incentives are aligned (Panel B). We find no significant correlation
between the untabulated quiz score, age, gender, risk attitudes, or the SD3 personality trait and
these measures of Reporter or User behavior. Regarding risk attitudes, we note recent arguments
that raise serious doubts about such measures (Friedman et al. 2014).
[insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
Summary statistics for the periodic results used for hypothesis testing are included in
Panels A and B of Table 3. Panel A confirms that under misaligned incentives, Reporters
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produce more overstatement errors (49%) than understatement errors (30%). Panel B
demonstrates that when incentives are aligned Reporters produce slightly fewer overstatement
errors (35%) than understatement errors (41%), and that errors are smaller in both magnitude and
variance (see |Error|

Neg and |Error|

Pos). Further, reports under aligned incentives are

both more consistent and accurate than under misaligned incentives (as Consistency and
Accuracy are configured so larger values represent more consistent and accurate reports,
respectively).
4.2 Hypothesis 1: Users disprefer Reporters likely to have reported aggressively
4.2.1 Testing hypothesis 1
We test hypothesis 1 by estimating equation (1) for the Misaligned treatment:
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘

𝛼

𝛼 𝑁𝑒𝑔

𝛼 𝑃𝑜𝑠

𝛽 |𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟|

𝑁𝑒𝑔

𝛽 |𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟|

𝑃𝑜𝑠

∑𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠

(1)

Where Rank is the User’s ranking position of a Reporter. Rank is inverted from the original
rankings (one through six where one is the most preferred) so that higher numbers reflect a better
ranking (six through one where six is the most preferred). Neg (Pos) is a binary variable that
identifies whether the current period report produced an understatement (overstatement) error;
the excluded term is for an error of zero. |Error| is the absolute value of the current period’s
reporting error (i.e., the report minus the state of nature). We utilize four control variables.
Consistency is the variance in the Reporter’s reporting errors multiplied by negative-one,
Accuracy is the Reporter’s average absolute reporting error multiplied by negative-one, while
OthersConsistency and OthersAccuracy are the average Consistency and Accuracy of the other
five Reporters. We multiply both values by negative-one so that larger numbers reflect more
consistent and accurate reports, respectively. We estimate equation (1) in a random-effects
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ordered logistic regression – where the User identifies the panels, and each ranking decision (six
per period) identifies the trials within panels – with robust errors clustered by User.
The fixed effect of an understatement error (overstatement error) on rankings is measured
by α1 (α2), while the marginal effect of an incremental understatement error (overstatement error)
on rankings is measured by β1 (β2). If the decline in Users’ rankings is larger for a large
overstatement error than an understatement error of equal magnitude (H1a), then the difference
in fitted values [(α1 + β1

|Error|) – (α2 + β2

|Error|)] will be positive for errors of large

magnitude. If the decline in rankings is larger for an incremental overstatement error than an
incremental understatement error (H1b), then the difference β1–β2 will be positive.
Note, however, that while Users observe Reporters’ full history of reporting errors each
period, our model in equation (1) measures the effect of over- and understatement errors for only
the most recent period. As such, our empirical tests for H1b will include models that incorporate
one and two lagged errors in addition to the default model outlined in equation (1).
4.2.2 Results for hypothesis 1
Results for the estimation of equation (1) are in Table 4. The first column presents
results for all periods without control variables. Column (2) estimates the full equation and
provides data for the current period’s reporting error, while columns (4) and (5) each add one
additional lagged error. Column (3) estimates the full equation and includes fixed effects for
each Reporter-User pair to control for possible instances where a User ‘locks-in’ to a Reporter
for reasons other than their reporting errors.
[insert Table 4 and Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of each reporting error on rankings and helps to provide
intuition for the regression results in Table 4. There appears to be a fixed ‘punishment’ for
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understatement errors (coefficient on Neg is significantly negative), and the slope on
understatement errors appears to be flat (coefficient on |Error|

Neg is insignificant in all

specifications with control variables).12 On the other hand, there appears to be a large downward
slope on overstatement errors (coefficient on |Error|

Pos is consistently negative and highly

significant across all specifications), and the best-fit line appears to provide a slightly positive
intercept (coefficient on Pos is positive, though not significantly so).
As expected, Table 4 reports that control variables Consistency and Accuracy
(OthersConsistency and OthersAccuracy) are positive (negative), indicating that Users prefer
Reporters who are more consistent (Koonce and Lipe 2010) and more accurate. While Accuracy
is no longer significant in column (5), likely because the additional lagged |Error| terms absorb
the effect of prior reporting accuracy, OthersAccuracy remains significant.
Panel A of Table 5 provides the estimates for the difference in fitted values of over- and
understatement errors of equal magnitude, our test of H1a. The coefficient of interest is positive
and significant for errors of magnitude ±3 or greater. Interestingly, this magnitude lines up
perfectly with the error in the signal (which ranged from –2 to +2), perhaps indicating that Users
were able to successfully intuit when Reporters attempted to exploit them via aggressive
reporting. This evidence provides clear support for hypothesis 1a that the decline in Users’
rankings is larger for a large overstatement than understatement error of equal magnitude.
[insert Table 5 about here]
Panel B provides estimates for β1–β2, i.e., our test of H1b. The coefficient of interest is
positive and significant for the current period’s reporting error in all five columns, as well as the

12

If there were no factors outside of consistency and accuracy to lead Users to disprefer understatement errors, one
would expect the coefficient on the ‘fixed effect’ Neg to also be insignificant. We speculate that it is consistently
negative across models because of a recency effect where User assessments of Reporter consistency and accuracy
place disproportionate weight on the most recent period’s reporting error.
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coefficient on the first and second lagged error when included. Table 4 indicates the robust
effect of incremental overstatement errors, as the coefficients are significantly negative (at 1%)
in all columns and for all lags. This evidence provides clear support in favor of hypothesis 1b
that the decline in Users’ rankings is larger for an incremental overstatement error than an
incremental understatement error.13 Taken together, our results indicate that Users disprefer
Reporters whose reporting errors likely reflect aggressive reporting.
4.3 Hypothesis 2: Users’ dispreference for aggressive reporting is driven by Reporters’ motives
4.3.1 Testing hypothesis 2
We test hypothesis 2 by estimating equation (2) with data from both the Misaligned and
Aligned treatments.
Rank = α0 + α1Neg + α2Pos + α3Misaligned + α4Neg Misaligned +
α5Pos Misaligned + β1|Error| Neg + β2|Error| Pos +
β3|Error| Neg Misaligned + β4|Error| Pos Misaligned +
∑βkControls + ∑βkControls Misaligned

(2)

Where Rank, Neg, Pos, and |Error|, and control variables Consistency, Accuracy,
OthersConsistency, and OthersAccuracy are as defined in equation (1). Misaligned is a binary
variable that identifies pairings in the Misaligned treatment. As in equation (1), the excluded
term is for an error of zero, so the effects of positive and negative errors are measured relative to
zero error. As before, our empirical tests for H2b will include models that incorporate one and
two lagged errors in addition to the default model outlined in equation (2). We estimate equation
(2) in a random-effects ordered logistic regression with standard errors clustered by User.

13

In untabulated tests, we measure the effect of socially aversive traits (the Dark Triad) on User preferences. We
use a median split to divide the population in the Misaligned treatment into low and high SD3 groups and find no
significant difference in preferences for over- and understatement errors between groups. Indeed, while socially
aversive individuals are less likely to be trustworthy (which would affect the Reporter’s actions in our setting), it is
less clear how they differ in their perception of others’ trustworthiness (Smith 2008, 250-256; Furnham et al. 2013).
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The fixed effect of an understatement error (overstatement error) on rankings in the
Aligned treatment is measured by α1 (α2), while the marginal effect of an incremental
understatement error (overstatement error) on rankings is measured by β1 (β2). The fixed effect
of an understatement error (overstatement error) on rankings in the Misaligned treatment is
measured by α1+α3+α4 (α2+α3+α5), while the marginal effect of an incremental understatement
error (overstatement error) on rankings is measured by β1+β3 (β2+β4).
If our prediction from H1a is driven by Reporters’ motivation to report aggressively
(H2a), then the difference-in-differences in fitted values [(α4 + β3

|Error|) – (α5 + β4

|Error|)]

will be positive for errors of large magnitude.14 If our prediction from H1b is driven by
Reporters’ motivation to report aggressively (H2b), then the difference-in-differences in slopes
(β3–β4) will be positive; this prediction is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.
[insert Figure 2 and Table 6 about here]
4.3.2 Results for hypothesis 2
Results for the estimation of equation (2) are in Table 6. The first column presents
results for all periods without control variables. Column (2) estimates the full equation and
provides data for the current period’s reporting error, while columns (4) and (5) each add one
additional lagged error. Column (3) estimates the full equation and includes fixed effects for
each Reporter-User pair. Control variables Consistency and Accuracy (OthersConsistency and
OthersAccuracy) are positive (negative) in the Aligned treatment – consistent with the
Misaligned results from Table 4 – although there appear to be some differences in magnitude
between treatments, as some coefficients on the Misaligned interactions are significant.

14

The difference in fitted values for under- versus overstatement errors in the Misaligned versus Aligned treatments:
[(α1+α3+α4+β1 |Error|+β3 |Error|) – (α2+α3+α5+β2 |Error|+β4 |Error|)] – [(α1+ β1 |Error|) – (α2+ β2 |Error|)] =
[(α4 + β3 |Error|) – (α5 + β4 |Error|)]. As with H1b, our empirical tests for H2b will include models that
incorporate one and two lagged errors in addition to the default model outlined in equation (2).

23

Panel A of Table 7 provides the estimates for the difference-in-differences in fitted
values, our test of H2a. In Panel A of Table 5 we found that the decline in Users’ rankings is
larger for overstatement than understatement errors of magnitude ±3 or greater; here, we confirm
that these differences are driven by Reporters’ motivation to report aggressively, as the
coefficients are slightly larger in magnitude and are all statistically significant. This evidence
provides clear support for hypothesis 2a.
[insert Table 7 about here]
Panel B provides estimates for β3–β4, identifying whether the difference-in-differences in
slopes is significant, our test of H2b. The coefficient of interest is positive and significant for the
current period’s reporting error in all five columns. The coefficient on the first lag is positive but
insignificant in columns (4) and (5), while the coefficient on the second lagged error is
significant in column (5). The estimates in column (2) are used to illustrate our results in Panel
B of Figure 2, which visually demonstrates that the results conform to our directional
predictions. This evidence provides support for hypothesis 2b. Taken together, our results
indicate that Users’ dispreference for aggressive reporting is driven by Reporters’ motivation to
report aggressively.
4.4 Robustness test: Measures of trust as alternate dependent variables
After the last period – when Users typically rank Reporters for the next period’s pairings
– we instead ask all participants (both Users and Reporters) to identify each Reporter as one they
either “trust” or “don’t trust” (first-order reports). We then ask all participants to select which
Reporters the Users said they trust (second-order reports), and we provide a payment for each
correct selection. These data allow us to supplement our hypothesis 1 findings on User
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preferences in the Misaligned treatment, which we posit are driven by Users’ trust in Reporters,
and to confirm the universality of this link via Users’ second-order reports.
We analyze the trust dependent variables in the Misaligned treatment within logit
regressions, using dummy variables for Reporters in the bottom (Understated) and top
(Overstated) quartiles of aggregate errors, as well as control variables Consistency and Accuracy
from our prior analyses; Understated Reporters were those with negative aggregate reporting
errors. The results (untabulated) indicate that Users’ reports on trust are broadly consistent with
their period-by-period preference rankings. Results from Users’ first-order reports indicate that,
ceteris paribus, they are significantly more likely to trust an Understated than Overstated
Reporter. Importantly, Users’ second-order reports confirm this result, providing some evidence
that Users perceive a shared understanding regarding the link between reporting errors and
Reporters’ underlying intentions in light of their motive to report aggressively.
4.5 Additional robustness tests
We perform additional untabulated tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results (i)
across different participant ‘communities’ and (ii) across periods within the game. First, we reestimate results and re-perform hypothesis tests after successively removing each community in
our sample (a Misaligned community for H1a/H1b and an Aligned community for H2a/H2b).
For H1a [H2a] we re-estimate the value for ±5 in Panel A of Table 5 [Table 7], and for H1b
[H2b] we re-estimate the value for column (2) in Panel B of Table 5 [Table 7]. All coefficients
for H1a, H1b, and H2a remain significant at the 10% level, while seven of eight coefficients for
H2b remain significant at the 10% level (the excepted p-value = 0.135). This indicates that our
findings are not driven by behavior within a single outlier community of participants.
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We also re-estimate results for column (2) of Table 4 for each successive three-period
subsample (i.e., periods 2–4, 3–5, … 7–9). Due to the significant loss of power in these results,
each of which are based on only three-eighths of our full Misaligned sample, we focus on the
most core element of our study: that, ceteris paribus, Users disprefer Reporters who produce
larger overstatement errors. We find that for all successive three-period subsamples, an
incremental overstatement error is associated with a decline in User rankings at a 5% level of
statistical significance. Moreover, a review of period-by-period results shows no clear pattern of
these results either monotonically strengthening or weakening as the game proceeds, as the
coefficient on an incremental overstatement error is negative and significant at a 1% level in
periods 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9. This suggests that our findings are not driven by early-period behavior
that dissipates over time as participants gain experience in our setting.
4.6 Analysis of responses to post-experimental questionnaire in the Misaligned treatment
We administered a short, non-incentivized survey after completion of the experiment and
the incentivized “trust/don’t trust” task. We ask all participants about appropriate reporting rules
for the Reporter and how they knew whether the rule was followed, as well as about their
strategy and whether and why it might have changed during the experiment.15
When asked what reporting rule Reporters should follow, Users’ responses describe a
primary preference for accuracy (e.g., “Report the [signal]”). Reporters’ responses are split
between promoting accuracy versus aggressive reporting. A few oppose aggressive reporting,
with one saying: “Consider that only you will make more money if you report a higher number.
Reporting a number similar to the [signal] gives the [User] a better chance at making money.”16

15

To maintain consistency, we replace participants’ references to the experimental labels ‘Sender’ and ‘Receiver’
with our conceptual labels ‘Reporter’ and ‘User’, respectively, e.g., “Sender” will be replaced with “[Reporter].”
16
This Reporter’s comment that “only you will make more money” (emphasis added) implies a consideration of
total social welfare, as an aggressive report that induces an aggressive action results in ‘us’ earning less money.
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Both Reporters and Users state that they use the reporting error charts to monitor
Reporters’ rule compliance and read their intentions. A User states: “If the square more often
than not hits the 0 it's likely the [Reporter] is using that rule. If it more often than not appears
(slightly) above he's trying to squeeze a little bit extra at the expense of the [User]. If it is
consistently below the [Reporter] is incompetent.” On overstatement errors, one Reporter states
“they were probably playing to make the most out of their own profit instead of mutual profit.”
When asked about their strategy, some Users describe an aversion to overstatement
errors. One User describes that if a Reporter’s “reports differed on average over 2 away from the
numbers I wouldn't trust them to give me an accurate clue. …I would know they were just trying
to make more money for themselves.” Another User concisely summarizes their view of trust:
As described above the [Reporter] with the most and recent "0"s was the most trustworthy. If a
[Reporter] had more lowballs I would trust him faster than one with more highballs as it would be
less in the favor of the [Reporter] to give lower numbers. In that case I would ascribe it to chance.
With highballs it was more likely the [Reporter] tried to get that extra little money.

Lastly, a few Reporters link aggressive reporting to lower rankings from Users, with one
claiming “I tried to become more trustworthy by reporting the [signal] to get the bonus” and
another changing strategy after reporting aggressively “because people were giving me bad
ratings and i (sic) was earning less money.”
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Contrasting social norm predictions with economic theory predictions
We follow the recommendations of Brown et al. (2009) and Stevens (2019) and contrast
our predictions with those derived from neoclassical economic theory. To do so, we derive the
theoretical equilibrium for our game; see Appendix 4. Given our simplifying assumptions, when
the Reporter is motivated to report aggressively in the Misaligned treatment, the Nash
equilibrium is ‘babbling’ and the Reporter’s message contains no information – for example,
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they randomize their reports. On the other hand, a ‘truth-telling’ equilibrium can emerge in the
Aligned treatment. In both cases, Users expect that all Reporters play identical strategies, so they
are indifferent between Reporters.17 As such, the prediction from economic theory is that Users’
preferences are unassociated with both reporting errors and the Reporter’s motivation, which
contrast with hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. These predictions are unchanged after
considering the effect of the payoff adjustments driven by Users’ rankings.
Economic theory, therefore, establishes null hypotheses which clearly contrast with our
social norm hypotheses. In line with prior research (e.g., see Hobson et al. 2011), because User
preferences in the Misaligned treatment deviate from their economic self-interest in the
hypothesized direction, we infer that it reflects Users’ expectation that a social norm applies in
that situation.18 Indeed, because Users in the Misaligned treatment are able to effectively
discount Reporters’ bias, their earnings are similar to those under Aligned incentives (see Table
2), further emphasizing that their preferences are driven by something other than economic selfinterest. As we fail to find these preferences in the Aligned treatment, we infer that it reflects a
behavioral preference driven by how Users view Reporters’ intentions in light of their motives.
5.2 Identifying a social norm
To place our findings in context, we translate Bicchieri (2006, 11)’s conditions for a
social norm to our experimental setting, where we posit that aggressive reporting violates a
norm. If so, a necessary initial condition is that enough Users expect that the behavioral rule

17

Prior experiments show that while Reporters tend to adopt deceptive reporting practices, they transmit more
information than predicted (Blume et al. 1998; Forsythe et al. 1999; Dickhaut et al. 2003; Cai and Wang 2006).
There is also evidence that some Reporters reject economic incentives to mislead in favor of truth-telling (SánchezPagés and Vorsatz 2007; Hurkens and Kartik 2009; Gneezy et al. 2013; Sheremeta and Shields 2013).
18
By bringing their sociality into the laboratory and not viewing the interaction as strictly an economic game (Smith
2008), the subjects experience a social welfare gain. In the Misaligned treatment, the per-period payoffs predicted
by economic theory in Appendix 4 are $11.15 for the Reporter and $11.31 for the User, while the actual payoffs (per
Panel B of Table 2) are $14.75 and $12.55, respectively.
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exists and that it applies. A norm would then exist if enough Reporters: (i) know that the rule
exists and that it applies, and (ii) prefer to conform to the rule under the condition that (a) they
believe enough other Reporters conform and, either (b) they believe enough members in the
community expect them to conform, or (c) they believe enough members in the community
expect and prefer for them to conform and that Users may sanction them for not doing so.19
Our experiment is designed to establish Users’ normative expectations – the necessary
initial condition above – and likely did not allow for sufficient communication of Users’
expectations to Reporters.20 Participants interacted with up to six different partners for only ten
periods in total, and Reporters had to infer all of the Users’ preferences from only their own
ranking each period, without the benefit of direct communication, and with no knowledge about
any prior history of similar interactions. As such, future research may identify an alternate
design to test whether our setting satisfies the remaining necessary conditions for a social norm.
5.3 Future research
We offer additional directions for future research. First, future research might identify
whether, once conservatism is “codified” as an accounting institution, it supports impersonal
exchange by promoting reputation formation and facilitating reciprocity (Basu and Waymire
2006, 220). Second, in our setting, neither party’s payoff is increasing in the magnitude of the
state of nature. As such, a signal greater than (lesser than) the historical average does not reflect
‘good’ (‘bad’) news, so we cannot identify whether Users prefer reports that incorporate bad
news in the signal more completely than good news (Basu 1997). Future research can extend our
19

Whereas in conditions (a) and (b) a Reporter will conform due to intrinsic norm-following utility, condition (c)
allows a norm to exist where Reporters have no norm-following utility and conform in order to avoid sanctioning.
20
Results from our incentivized “trust/don’t trust” task (section 4.4) indicate a significant mismatch in the parties’
beliefs about which actions build trust, as results from Reporters’ second-order reports indicate their belief that,
ceteris paribus, Users are significantly less likely to trust an Understated Reporter. Further, Reporters wrongly
believe that User trust is not significantly associated with Consistency. These results are consistent with the notion
that our experimental setting did not allow Users to effectively communicate their expectations to Reporters.
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findings to a setting where this can be tested. Third, in our robustness tests we find some
evidence that Users disprefer overstatement errors as early as period 3 and as late as period 9.
Future research might teach us more about the innateness of this preference and whether and
how it evolves with experience. Fourth, it would be useful to find empirical evidence from realworld settings to determine whether and how the preferences we observe in social exchange
extend to personal and impersonal market exchange (Smith and Wilson 2019). Lastly, future
research might provide evidence on the nature of the norm, e.g. whether it contains elements of
an honesty (e.g., Douthit and Stevens 2014) or fairness norm (e.g., Bicchieri and Chavez 2010).
5.4 Conclusion
We briefly discuss potential implications from our study. First, we present standardsetters with a view of accounting that reflects rules of conduct designed to restrain unsocial
behavior and arbitrate conflicts of interest, rather than rules of measurement designed to
accurately communicate the complex results of economic events (Solomons 1986, 243).21 Along
these lines, one key takeaway from our study is that Users incorporate Reporters’ motives in
their preferences over reports. Evolved social norms often incorporate more information than
rules-based standards (Sunder 2005), which may be derived from normative models of what
standard-setters believe financial statement users should want (Young 2006). To the extent
standards are set based on models that exclude considerations of preparers’ motives, they are
likely to contain some degree of constructivist error (Smith 2008). At a more detailed level, our
study may be useful to standard-setters by identifying those conditions where users are likely to
value conservatism – and by identifying conditions where users are less likely to demand
conservatism, like when measurement uncertainty is low (e.g., Level 1 assets under U.S. GAAP).

21

We attribute this distinction and description to a speech given by FASB member David Mosso, as reported in the
January 26, 1978 issue of FASB Viewpoints, quoted in Solomons (1986).

30

Lastly, we provide evidence consistent with a latent demand for conservatism in a setting
where the signal contains neither ‘good news’ nor ‘bad news’ and in which neither gains nor
losses are reported, i.e., in a setting where conditional conservatism cannot exist. We further
note that a real-world agent seeking to minimize overstatement of net income would naturally
record only highly verifiable gains while recording less verifiable losses. That is, through our
‘moral hazard’ lens, gains and losses are treated consistently under conditional conservatism, as
both are treated in the fashion necessary to minimize ex post overstatement errors.
Following the influential Basu (1997) study, a large stream of research has focused on the
differential treatment of accounting gains and losses, which compare a reported value to some
reference point at the time a report is issued. We encourage an increased focus on reporting
errors, which are determined after realized outcomes are observed. Indeed, that ex post errors are
vital in driving behavior is consistent with the insight that economic action develops through
adaptive human response to the success or failure of realized exchange outcomes (Alchian 1950).
We propose that the differential timeliness for gains versus losses that we observe today may be
a consequence of humans’ normative aversion to overstatement errors that are likely to reflect
aggressive reporting. That is, we propose the possibility that conservatism arose not only from
an asymmetry between ex ante gains and losses, but also from an asymmetry in human reactions
to ex post overstatement errors and understatement errors.
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APPENDIX 1. Instructions for participants in the Misaligned treatment

INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds for
this research. The currency used in the experiment is U.S. dollars, expressed with a ‘$’. At the end of the
experiment your earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash. It is very important that you remain silent
and do not look at others’ monitors. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise
your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to
leave and you will not be paid. We expect, and appreciate, that you adhere to these policies.

Today’s Experiment
During each period of today’s experiment, you will be paired with another participant in the room. One of you
will be a Sender and the other will be a Receiver. There is an equal chance that you will be a Sender or a
Receiver, and you will stay in the same role for the entire experiment.
There will be two communities in the room today. The participants in the first two rows will be a community
of 6 Senders and 6 Receivers (the Front community), and the participants in the back two rows will be another
community of 6 Senders and 6 Receivers (the Rear community). You will never interact with any member
outside of your community. At the conclusion of the experiment, there will be an announcement indicating
which community collected the most cash earnings.
Within your community, there will be new Sender-Receiver pairings during each of the ten periods. Each
period, the Sender and Receiver are paired together for a collaborative partnership opportunity.
What Is the Opportunity?
Each period, each Sender-Receiver pair receives a number. However, neither the Sender nor the Receiver
know the number beforehand. The number is revealed to the pair at the end of each period. The number is an
integer from 1 to 10 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). The number in one period does not affect the number in
other periods.
Once paired with a Receiver, the Sender gets a private clue about the number. The clue is in the form of a
single number. The Receiver does not receive the Sender’s clue, and will never see the clue.
On average, the clue equals the number. The clue can be different from the number, and, when it is different,
there is an equal chance it is less than or more than the clue. After observing the clue, the Sender submits a
report for the Receiver about the number expected that period. The report is a single number from 1 to 10. The
report does not affect what the number is.
After the Receiver sees the report, they make a guess about what the number will be that period. The guess is a
single number from 1 to 10. The guess does not affect what the number is.
Last, both the Sender and Receiver are informed of the guess and the number for the period, as well as their
respective earnings. The earnings for all differences between the guess and number are shown in the table
below. Notice the earnings do not depend upon either the Sender’s report or their private clue.
Guess is less than the number

Guess is more than the number

Guess –
Number

–9

–8

–7

–6

–5

–4

–3

–2

+2

+3

+4

+5

+6

+7

+8

+9

Receiver

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$5

$10 $15 $20 $15 $10

$5

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

Sender

$6

$7

$8

$9

$10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15 $16 $17 $18 $17 $16 $15 $14 $13 $12

Total

$6

$7

$8

$9

$10 $11 $17 $23 $29 $35 $31 $27 $23 $17 $16 $15 $14 $13 $12

–1

0

+1

The picture on the next page illustrates these earnings for certain outcomes.
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So, for example, if the Receiver’s guess was 3 more than the number, the Receiver earns $5 and the Sender
earns $18. If the guess was exactly equal to the number, the Receiver earns $20 and the Sender earns $15. If
the guess was 3 less than the number, the Receiver earns $5 and the Sender earns $12.

The Receiver’s Decision to Collaborate
In the first period, each Sender will be randomly paired with a Receiver and they will collaborate in the
earnings opportunity (i.e., the Sender gets a clue and sends a report, and then the Receiver sees the report and
makes a guess).
Starting in the 2nd period, the Receiver decides whether to collaborate with the Sender, and this decision
determines whether the partnership opportunity takes place. Everyone in the community sees six charts,
illustrating each Sender’s prior reporting errors – that is, the difference between their report and the number for
all past periods. For each period, a black square will show if the Sender’s report was bigger than the number,
was less than the number, or was equal to the number.
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So, for example, if the Sender’s report is 2 more than the number, a black square will show at 2 on the vertical
axis. If the report is 2 less than the number, a black square will show at –2. This will be the case for reporting
errors between 4 and –4.
While reporting errors can possibly go from 9 to –9, in order to fit all six charts on the screen we restrict the
vertical area of the chart to show the range from 4 to –4. If the Sender’s report is 5 or 6 more than the number,
a red triangle pointing upwards will show at “4”. If the Sender’s report is 5 or 6 less than the number, a blue
triangle pointing downwards will show at “–4”. If the Sender’s report is 7, 8, or 9 more than the number, a
larger red triangle pointing upwards will show at “4”. If the Sender’s report is 7, 8, or 9 less than the number,
a larger blue triangle pointing downwards will show at “–4”.
The Receiver sees reporting error charts for all 6 Senders, and the chart of the Sender they are paired with in
the current period will be highlighted. If the Receiver decides not to collaborate with their paired Sender that
period, they will not interact, and both the Receiver and the Sender earn $5 for the period.
While the Receiver is deciding whether to collaborate, the Sender makes their report. Even if the Receiver
decides not to collaborate, the Sender’s reporting error for that period will be included in the next period’s
chart.
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Sender’s Bonus and Pairing
The earnings for the Sender in each period are adjusted by a bonus amount. In the first period the Senders are
selected in a random order, and their bonus is based on the position they are randomly selected. If they are
selected in the first two positions their earnings will increase, and if they are selected in the last two positions
their earnings will decrease, as shown in the table below.
Sender selection
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6

Earnings Adjustment
+$4
+$3
$0
$0
–$3
–$4

Starting with the beginning of the second period, every Receiver ranks every Sender in order of preference,
starting with the Sender they most prefer to collaborate with at 1 and the Sender they least prefer to collaborate
with at 6. These rankings are used to pair each Receiver with a Sender and to determine the Sender’s bonus
amount, as follows.
Each period, every Receiver is randomly assigned a selection slot from #1 to #6. The Receiver selecting #1 is
paired with their most preferred Sender; the Receiver selecting #2 is paired with their most preferred Sender
still available; the Receiver selecting #3 is paired with their most preferred Sender still available; and so forth,
until all pairings are determined for the period.
The Sender’s bonus is based upon how early they are selected. If they are selected in the first two positions
their earnings will increase, and if they are selected in the last two positions their earnings will decrease, as
shown in the table above. Through this process, the Sender’s bonus depends on where they are ranked in the
Receivers’ order of preference.
Once the pairings are determined, each party is informed of the outcome. The Receiver is notified which
Sender they are paired with (e.g. “You are paired with your 3rd choice”). The Sender is notified of which
position they were selected and of their average ranking across all Receivers in that period. For example, if
half of the Receivers ranked a particular Sender 3rd and the other half ranked the Sender 4th, then the Sender’s
average ranking across all Receivers would be 3.5.
The period then continues as described above, as the Receiver decides whether to collaborate and the Sender
receives their private clue and submits their report.

39

Summary of Each Period
The first period:
 Senders and Receivers are randomly paired
 Everyone is informed of the pairings for that period
 Senders see their private clue and submit their report
 Receivers see the report and make their guess
Every period after the first period:
 Receivers see charts of past periods’ reporting errors of all Senders
 Receivers ranks each Sender in order of preference
 Senders will be paired based on Receivers’ preferences
 Everyone is informed of the pairings for that period
 Senders are informed of their average rank among all Receivers
Every period after the first period, once the pairings are announced:
 Receivers decide whether to collaborate with their paired Sender
 Senders see their private clue and submit their report
If the Receiver chooses to not collaborate in the period:
 The Receiver and the Sender both earn $5 for the period
 The Sender’s total earnings include a bonus
If the Receiver chooses to collaborate in the period:
 The Receiver sees the report and makes their guess
 Both the Receiver and the Sender are informed of the guess, number, and of their earnings
 The Sender’s total earnings include a bonus
Now let’s review what each period will look like for Receiver and Sender.
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Sender: Reporting Decision
If you are a Sender, you will see the following on your computer monitor each period:

Your private clue about the number that period is shown in the ‘Submit’ window as “Your Clue.”
As a Sender, you must submit a report for the Receiver after seeing your private clue. You can report any value
from 1 to 10. Your report does not affect the number. Once you decide what to report, press the “Submit”
button.
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Receiver: Ranking Senders in Order of Preference
If you are a Receiver, you will see all Senders’ prior reporting errors in a chart like this on your computer
monitor each period, starting with the second period:

A black square will indicate whether, for each period so far, that Sender’s report overstated or understated the
number. A square above the middle line means they reported larger than the number, and a square below the
middle line means they reported less than the number. A square on the middle line means they reported the
exact number.
The black squares that indicate reporting errors are omitted in the above image, but they will appear on your
screen during the experiment.
If you are a Receiver, you must rank each Sender in order of preference, starting with the Sender you most
want to collaborate with at 1 and ending with the Sender you least want to collaborate with at 6.

Receiver: Decision to Collaborate with Sender
In the first period, you will be randomly paired with a Sender and do not have an option to opt out of
collaboration.
Starting with the second period, once the pairings are announced, each Receiver decides whether to collaborate
with their paired Sender. If the Receiver chooses not to collaborate, both the Receiver and Sender earn $5
instead of having the opportunity to earn the amounts listed on the first page. If you are the Receiver, you will
see the following on your computer monitor each period:
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The black squares that indicate reporting errors are omitted in the screenshot above, but they will appear on
your screen during the experiment.

Receiver: Make a Guess
If you are the Receiver and you have chosen to collaborate (or if it is the first period), you will see the
following on your computer monitor:

The report from the Sender will be stated in the Submit window as “Report.” After the first period, you will
also be provided with details about the Sender’s prior reporting errors. The chart for the Sender you are paired
with will be highlighted. If it is the first period, like in the picture above, the will be no charts.
If you are the Receiver, you must make your guess of what the number will be that period. Your guess must be
from 1 to 10. Your guess will not affect what the number is.
Once you enter a guess, the ‘Potential Earnings’ table will update. The table reports what your earnings and the
Sender’s earnings will be for each possible number, based upon your current guess. You can change your
guess to update the table. Once you decide what number to guess, press the “Submit” button.
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Results
If the Receiver chooses not to collaborate in the period, both the Receiver and the Sender are informed of the
decision and that their earnings for the period are $5 (before the Sender’s bonus adjustment).
If the Receiver chooses to collaborate in the period, both the Receiver and the Sender are informed of both the
Receiver’s guess and the number for the period, and of their respective earnings for the period.
After reviewing the results, please press the “Continue” button. The period’s results will be added to a table
displayed on your monitor with all the prior periods’ results.
Whether the Receiver chooses to collaborate in the period or chooses not to collaborate, the information on the
Sender’s report and the number for the period will be incorporated into the Sender’s reporting error chart in the
next period.

Conclusion
At the end of 10 periods, the experiment is over. You will be asked to complete a short survey and wait until
your name is called. When it is, bring your belongings and walk to the cashier’s window in the front of the
laboratory. You will be paid in cash for the earnings from one of the ten periods, chosen at random.

Sequence of Today’s Experiment
1.
2.
3.
4.

Quiz
10 periods of Sender-Receiver collaborative opportunities
Demographic information
Survey while payment is being processed
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APPENDIX 2. Quiz questions for participants in the Misaligned treatment
You will be a Receiver or Sender and will remain in that role for the entire experiment.
 True
 False
If you are a Receiver, you will definitely be partnered with the same Sender during the entire
experiment. If you a Sender, you will definitely be partnered with the same Receiver during the
entire experiment.
 True
 False
In each period that the Receiver decides to not collaborate, then, before the bonus adjustment:
 The Receiver and Sender earn $0 apiece
 The Receiver and Sender earn $5 apiece
Every period the Sender gets a private clue and sends a report to the Receiver. The report:
 Must be equal to the clue
 Can be any number between 1 to 10
In each period that the Receiver decides to collaborate, their guess:
 Must be equal to the Sender's report
 Can be any number between 1 to 10
The Sender's earnings (based on the Receiver's guess and the actual number) are adjusted by a
bonus:
 True
 False
If a Receiver's guess is 2 more than the actual number, the earnings for the period (ignoring the
bonus adjustment) are:^
 $10 for the Receiver and $17 for the Sender
 $10 for the Receiver and $13 for the Sender
If the Receiver's guess is 2 less than the actual number, the total for the period (ignoring the
bonus adjustment) are:^
 $10 for the Receiver and $17 for the Sender
 $10 for the Receiver and $13 for the Sender
The Receiver's earnings are largest when:
 Their guess is 3 larger than the actual number
 Their guess is equal to the number

^

We modified the Sender’s (i.e., Reporter’s) payoffs for the quiz provided to participants in the Aligned treatment.
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The Sender's earnings (ignoring bonus adjustment) are largest when the Receiver’s guess:
 Is 3 larger than the actual number
 Is equal to the actual number
You will be paid for the earnings from one period, chosen at random.
 True
 False
If the Sender's report is 7, the Receiver's guess is 6, and the number is 5, the Sender's reporting
error chart in that period will show +1.
 True
 False
The Receivers' ranking of preferred Senders affects the Senders' bonus adjustment.
 True
 False
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APPENDIX 3. Risk assessment measure for all participants
Participants in all treatments viewed on their monitor the following risk attitude measure
adapted from Dave et al. (2010).
We want you to select from among six different choices the one choice you would like to be paid
for. The six different choices are listed below.
Each choice has two possible payoffs (Heads or Tails) with the indicated probabilities of
occurring. Your payoff for this part of the study will be determined by:



Which of the six choices you select, and
Which of the two possible payoffs occur, determined by a computer coin flip.

For example, if you select Choice 4 and Tails occurs, you will earn $5.2 If Heads occurs, you
earn $1.6.
For every Choice, each flip outcome (Head or Tails) has a 50% chance of occurring.
Coin Flip
Choice 1
Choice 2
Choice 3
Choice 4
Choice 5
Choice 6

Payoff

Chances

Heads

$2.8

50%

Tails

$2.8

50%

Heads

$2.4

50%

Tails

$3.6

50%

Heads

$2.0

50%

Tails

$4.4

50%

Heads

$1.6

50%

Tails

$5.2

50%

Heads

$1.2

50%

Tails

$6.0

50%

Heads

$0.2

50%

Tails

$7.0

50%
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APPENDIX 4. Derivation of theoretical equilibrium and alternate predictions
In this Appendix we derive the equilibrium predictions for our game in order to provide formal
benchmarks for our hypotheses. We assume that Reporters (senders) and Users (receivers) have
no intrinsic utility from norm following.
The setup and payoffs in our experiment closely resemble the analytical model of Crawford and
Sobel (1982). In that model, homogenous agents have a common prior on the states of nature,
know the signal structure of the Reporter’s information, and seek to maximize their own payoffs.
When Reporters are not motivated to report aggressively – that is, when there are no conflicts of
interest between the action the Reporter and the User desire – truthful and complete disclosure is
possible. However, Crawford and Sobel predict that larger conflict of interests lead Reporters to
suppress information. Given sufficiently large conflicts of interest, all Nash equilibrium will be
in “partition equilibrium” where adjacent private signals are pooled together, masking
information, where in the limit Reporters reveal no information. Crawford and Sobel prove there
can be multiple equilibria, including a “babbling equilibrium” where Users glean no information
from the Reporter’s message, and others in which information can be transmitted from the
Reporter to the User.
To derive the theoretical equilibrium in our game, we assume all modeled agents are risk neutral,
have utility only from their own earnings, and that they have common priors and common
knowledge of the states of nature and the Reporter’s private signal structure (i.e., the ‘noise’).
(We employ these latter assumptions for tractability and acknowledge that our game incorporates
ambiguity over the states of nature and the Reporter’s private signal.) Further, for the time being
we will ignore the effect of the payoff adjustments driven by Users’ rankings.
In each period, the Reporter’s private signal is a discrete integer value 𝑦 ~ Uniform 3,8 and he
knows the state of nature 𝑠 ∈ 𝑦 2, 𝑦 1, 𝑦, 𝑦 1, 𝑦 2 with probability
, , , , ,
respectively. The Reporter reports a value 𝑚 ∈ 1,2, … , 9,10 . After seeing the report, the User
chooses an action 𝑖 ∈ 1,2, … , 9,10 . Thereafter the state of nature, action, and realized payoffs
are revealed to both agents. Payoffs are determined as follows:
𝜋
𝜋

𝑖, 𝑠, 𝑏
18 – |𝑖 – 𝑠 – 𝑏|
𝑖, 𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥 0, 20– 5
|𝑖– 𝑠|

where the bias 𝑏 represents the conflict of interest between the Reporter and User, is common
knowledge, and is manipulated across treatments.
A reporting strategy for the Reporter maps private signals to messages 𝛼: 𝑌 → 𝑀, and an action
strategy for the User maps messages to action 𝛽: 𝑀 → 𝐼. The Nash equilibrium is a pair of
strategies, denoted as 𝛼 ∗ , 𝛽∗ , where in expectation each strategy is a best-response to the other.
Formally, this means for action strategies and messages used in equilibrium:
𝐸 𝜋

𝛽∗ 𝛼 ∗ 𝑦 , 𝑠, 𝑏

𝛽∗ 𝑚 , 𝑠, 𝑏

𝐸 𝜋
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∀𝑚 ∈𝑀

(A1)

𝐸𝜋

𝛽∗ 𝑚 , 𝑠

𝐸𝜋

𝑖, 𝑠

∀𝑖 ∈𝐼

(A2)

The most informative reporting equilibrium strategies, satisfying equations (A1) and (A2) above,
are shown in the table below.
Table A1. Nash Equilibrium for different conflicts of interest
Conflicts of
interest
𝑏 0
Aligned

Reporting strategies/
Expected Reporter payoff
{3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}
.
$17
𝐸𝜋

Action strategies/
Expected User payoff
{3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}
𝐸𝜋
.
$15

𝑏 3
Misaligned

{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
𝐸𝜋
. ≅ $11.15

{5 or 6}
𝐸𝜋
.

≅ $11.31

When the conflicts of interest are at 𝑏 3, then messages have no information in equilibrium
and the User is indifferent between choosing an action of 5 or 6. That is, when Reporters are
sufficiently motivated to report aggressively, Users expect that all Reporters are “babbling” and
they are indifferent between them. Therefore, their preferences will be unassociated with
Reporters’ reporting error histories. As such, for hypothesis 1 economic theory predicts that
Users’ preferences are unassociated with reporting errors.
When there are no conflicts of interests (𝑏 0) – that is, where Reporters are not motivated to
report aggressively – a truthful reporting strategy can emerge in equilibrium, where the Reporter
reveals their private signal 𝑦 ∈ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and the User chooses an action equal to the
message value. As Users expect that all Reporters are truth-telling, they are indifferent between
Reporters and view the resulting reporting errors as random noise. As such, for hypothesis 2
economic theory predicts that Users’ preferences are unassociated with the Reporters’
motivation.
Lastly, we consider the effect of the payoff adjustments driven by Users’ ranking of Reporters.
Consider the last period of our game. Since there is no payoff adjustment after the last period,
Reporters who may have otherwise moderated their reporting strategy due to the adjustment will
revert to maximizing their own payoff. Anticipating this, Users will be indifferent to which
Reporter they are paired with in the last period, so the Reporters’ history of reporting errors will
have no effect on their rankings at the end of the next-to-last period. Knowing that the Users’
ranking at the end of the penultimate period is meaningless, Reporters will again revert to
maximizing their own payoff in this period, as in expectation the realized reporting errors will
have no bearing on their payoff adjustment. Anticipating this, Users will again be indifferent to
which Reporter they are paired with in the next-to-last period. By backwards induction, this is
true of the first period’s reporting strategies and the rankings at the end of the first period. That
is, to the extent agents are focused on the payoff adjustments, the effect is that throughout the
entire game Reporters will seek to maximize their payoffs and Users will be indifferent between
Reporters, resulting in preferences that are unassociated with Reporters’ reporting error histories.
As such, the predictions derived above are unchanged after considering the possible effect of the
payoff adjustments.
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FIGURE 1. Effect of reporting errors in the Misaligned treatment on next period’s rankings

Figure 1 illustrates the ceteris paribus effect of a Reporter’s reporting errors on their ranking in the next period in
the Misaligned treatment. The estimates are from a regression of Rank on (i) indicator variables for each observed
reporting error value (except zero) and (ii) control variables Consistency, Accuracy, OthersConsistency, and
OthersAccuracy. The regression specifications were in-line with those for equation (1): a random-effects ordered
logistic regression with standard errors clustered by User.
Coefficient estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level are shown with a larger marker. The
square at the origin indicates that an error of zero was excluded from the regression, so coefficients for all other
errors are measured relative to an error of zero. Only error values with 30 or more observations are shown.
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FIGURE 2. Effect of incremental errors on next period’s rankings
Panel A. Predicted effect of incremental errors other than through consistency and accuracy channels

Panel B. Observed effect of incremental errors other than through consistency and accuracy channels

In Figure 2, Panel A illustrates our predictions that the decline in Users’ rankings is larger for an incremental
overstatement error than an incremental understatement error in the Misaligned treatment (H1a), and that this
difference is larger than in the Aligned treatment (H2a). Panel B presents the observed results using coefficients
from column (2) of Table 5, estimating equation (2). Effects predicted to be significantly different from zero (Panel
A) and coefficient estimates that are significant at the 5% level (Panel B) are shown with larger markers.
Rank = α0 + α1Neg + α2Pos + α3Misaligned + α4Neg Misaligned +
α5Pos Misaligned + β1|Error| Neg + β2|Error| Pos +
β3|Error| Neg Misaligned + β4|Error| Pos Misaligned +
∑βkControls + ∑βkControls Misaligned
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(2)

TABLE 1. Reporter and User payoffs in the Misaligned and Aligned treatments
Panel A. Payoffs in the Misaligned treatment

Action –
State
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
–4
–5
–6
–7
–8
–9

Reporter

User

Total

$12
$13
$14
$15
$16
$17
$18
$17
$16
$15
$14
$13
$12
$11
$10
$ 9
$ 8
$ 7
$ 6

$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 5
$10
$15
$20
$15
$10
$ 5
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0

$12
$13
$14
$15
$16
$17
$23
$27
$31
$35
$29
$23
$17
$11
$10
$ 9
$ 8
$ 7
$ 6

Panel B. Payoffs in the Aligned treatment

Action –
State
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
–4
–5
–6
–7
–8
–9

Reporter

User

Total

$ 9
$10
$11
$12
$13
$14
$15
$16
$17
$18
$17
$16
$15
$14
$13
$12
$11
$10
$ 9

$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 5
$10
$15
$20
$15
$10
$ 5
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0
$ 0

$ 9
$10
$11
$12
$13
$14
$20
$26
$32
$38
$32
$26
$20
$14
$13
$12
$11
$10
$ 9

Table 1 provides the payoffs for the Reporter and User in the Misaligned treatment (Panel A) and the Aligned
treatment (Panel B) for all possible outcomes. For both Panels, the Reporter payoffs represents the base payoff
before a bonus adjustment for the period is applied, if any.

52

TABLE 2. Summary statistics: Overall results per Reporter/User
Panel A. Misaligned treatment

Variable
Reporting Bias
Action Bias
Action Efficiency
Self-Sufficient
Reporter Earnings
User Earnings

Obs
48
48
48
48
48
48

Mean
0.47***
–0.39***
0.08
2.08%
$14.75***
$12.55

SEM
0.13
0.08
0.07
0.66%
$0.30
$0.30

25th Perc
0.00
–0.63
–0.25
–
$13.80
$11.25

Median
0.35
–0.40
0.00
–
$15.00
$12.75

75th Perc
1.40
–0.15
0.37
–
$16.25
$13.50

Obs
48
48
48
48
48
48

Mean
0.00
0.01
0.00
2.71%
$16.22
$12.64

SEM
0.04
0.09
0.08
0.77%
$0.33
$0.25

25th Perc
–0.20
–0.20
–0.26
–
$14.25
$11.50

Median
0.00
0.00
0.00
–
$16.45
$12.50

75th Perc
0.10
0.32
0.30
–
$18.25
$14.00

Panel B. Aligned treatment

Variable
Reporting Bias
Action Bias
Action Efficiency
Self-Sufficient
Reporter Earnings
User Earnings

Panel A (B) of Table 2 presents summary statistics (mean, standard error of the mean, and quartiles) for the overall
game results for the Misaligned (Aligned) treatment.
Reporting Bias is the average difference between the report and the signal for each Reporter. Action Bias (Action
Efficiency) is the average difference between the action and the report (the average difference between the action
and the signal) for each User. Self-Sufficient represents the average frequency each User chose not to collaborate,
i.e., chose self-sufficiency. Reporter Earnings (User Earnings) is the average earnings for the Reporter (User) in
each period. When the action equals the signal, both parties’ expected earnings is $15.00 in the Misaligned
treatment, while the Reporter’s expected earnings rises to $17.00 in the Aligned treatment.
Significance levels for differences in means between treatments based on two-tailed p-values using Wilcoxon
signed-rank test: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level
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TABLE 3. Summary statistics: Reporting characteristics per period
Panel A. Reporting characteristics: Misaligned treatment

Variable
Neg
Pos
|Error| Neg
|Error| Pos
Consistency
Accuracy

Obs
480
480
146
234
432
480

Mean
0.30
0.49
1.86
2.02
–1.29
–1.47

SEM
0.02
0.02
0.10
0.08
0.03
0.04

25th Perc
–
–
1.00
1.00
–1.56
–1.89

Median
–
–
2.00
2.00
–1.18
–1.33

75th Perc
–
–
2.00
2.00
–0.88
–1.00

25th Perc
–
–
1.00
1.00
–1.50
–1.67

Median
–
–
2.00
2.00
–1.10
–1.21

75th Perc
–
–
2.00
2.00
–0.80
–1.00

Panel B. Reporting characteristics: Aligned treatment

Variable
Neg
Pos
|Error| Neg
|Error| Pos
Consistency
Accuracy

Obs
480
480
195
167
432
480

Mean
0.41
0.35
1.71
1.84
–1.20
–1.37

SEM
0.02
0.02
0.07
0.09
0.04
0.04

Panel A (B) of Table 3 presents summary statistics (mean, standard error of the mean, and quartiles) for reporting
characteristics for the Misaligned (Aligned) treatment.
Neg identifies understatement errors, Pos identifies overstatement errors, and |Error| is the absolute value of the
reporting error. Consistency is the variance in the Reporter’s reporting errors multiplied by negative-one. Accuracy
is the Reporter’s average absolute reporting error multiplied by negative-one.
Table 3 provides reporting behavior for all ten periods. In order to control for repeated measures within reporters,
we test for significant differences between treatments in our regression analysis; see Table 6.
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TABLE 4. Revealed User preferences: Misaligned treatment
DV = Rank
Neg
Pos
|Error|

Neg

|Error|

Pos

(1)
Periods 1–9
–0.47***
(–2.81)
0.23
(1.20)
–0.57***
(–6.89)
–0.74***
(–9.29)

(2)
Periods 2–9
–0.56***
(–2.75)
0.17
(1.03)
0.06
(0.64)
–0.34***
(–4.29)

(3)
Periods 2–9
–0.41*
(–1.76)
0.20
(1.09)
0.02
(0.21)
–0.33***
(–4.27)

(4)
Periods 2–9
–0.61***
(–2.88)
0.15
(0.90)
0.01
(0.14)
–0.38***
(–4.54)
–0.40**
(–2.41)
0.10
(0.64)
0.04
(0.62)
–0.21***
(–2.96)

None
48
2,592
–4,362
8,743
8,795
182.19

0.95***
(4.06)
0.94***
(3.82)
–0.78***
(–3.36)
–1.21***
(–5.01)
None
48
2,304
–3,543
7,113
7,187
125.55

0.96***
(3.05)
2.14***
(5.00)
–0.90**
(–2.28)
–2.61***
(–6.87)
Pair
48
2,304
–2,968
5,964
6,044
.

0.96***
(3.95)
0.77***
(2.90)
–0.79***
(–3.35)
–1.21***
(–4.92)
None
48
2,304
–3,532
7,099
7,197
179.6

Lag1Neg
Lag1Pos
|Lag1Error|

Lag1Neg

|Lag1Error|

Lag1Pos

Lag2Neg
Lag2Pos
|Lag2Error|

Lag2Neg

|Lag2Error|

Lag2Pos

Consistency
Accuracy
OthersConsistency
OthersAccuracy
Fixed effects?
Total Users
Total Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Akaike information criterion
Bayesian information criterion
Wald chi-square

(5)
Periods 3–9
–0.65***
(–2.67)
0.17
(0.86)
0.01
(0.10)
–0.42***
(–4.53)
–0.40**
(–2.43)
0.11
(0.71)
-0.00
(-0.03)
–0.23***
(–2.85)
–0.50***
(–3.23)
0.19
(1.07)
0.12*
(1.88)
–0.21***
(–2.93)
1.09***
(3.47)
0.54
(1.48)
–0.96***
(–3.10)
–1.05***
(–3.26)
None
48
2,016
–3,088
6,217
6,335
158.36

Table 4 provides the results for the estimation of equation (1). Each observation reflects data on one User’s ranking
of one Reporter in one given period based upon their history of reporting errors. We utilize a random-effects
ordered logit regression because the dependent variable consists of six ordered categories. Standard errors are
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by User. Columns (1), (2) and (3) test the most recent reporting error, while
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Columns (4) and (5) include one and two additional lagged errors, respectively. For brevity, we omit the estimated
constants (i.e., the “cut-points”).
Rank is the ranking position and is inverted so higher numbers reflect a better ranking (so six is the most preferred
Reporter). Neg identifies understatement errors, Pos identifies overstatement errors, and |Error| is the absolute value
of the reporting error. Consistency is the variance in the Reporter’s reporting errors multiplied by negative-one.
Accuracy is the Reporter’s average absolute reporting error multiplied by negative-one. OthersConsistency and
OthersAccuracy are the average Consistency and Accuracy of the other five Reporters.
Z-statistics are in brackets underneath each coefficient. Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10%
level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level
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TABLE 5. Tests of hypothesis 1: Users disprefer Reporters likely to have reported aggressively
Panel A. Difference between understatement and overstatement errors of equal magnitude
Fitted values from column (2) of Table 4 H1a
±1
±2
±3
±4
(α1 + β1 |Error|) – (α2 + β2 |Error|)
+
–0.33††
0.08
0.48**
0.89***
[5.91]
[0.35]
[5.52]
[8.45]

±5
1.29***
[9.82]

Panel B. Difference between an incremental understatement and an incremental overstatement error
Differences in coefficients from Table 4
H1b
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
|Error| Neg – |Error| Pos
+
0.17*
0.41***
0.35***
0.39***
0.43***
[2.82]
[12.63]
[7.96]
[13.50]
[14.15]
+
0.25***
0.23***
|Lag1Error| Lag1Neg –
[8.25]
[6.65]
|Lag1Error| Lag1Pos
|Lag2Error| Lag2Neg –
+
0.34***
[13.70]
|Lag2Error| Lag2Pos
Panels A and B of Table 5 provide results for our tests of hypothesis 1, based on the results for the estimation of
equation (1) in Table 4.
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘

𝛼

𝛼 𝑁𝑒𝑔

𝛼 𝑃𝑜𝑠

𝛽 |𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟|

𝑁𝑒𝑔

𝛽 |𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟|

𝑃𝑜𝑠

∑𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠

(1)

Panel A provides the fitted values from column (2) of Table 4 for the difference in effect between errors of equal
magnitude from ±1 to ±5, shown in each column, on the Reporter’s ranking position. Panel B reports the difference
between the marginal effect of an incremental understatement error and overstatement error based on estimates from
each column of Table 4, as shown. Columns (4) and (5) include one and two additional lagged errors, respectively.
Chi-square statistics are in square brackets underneath each coefficient. Significance levels based on two-tailed pvalues: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level. In the direction opposite of prediction: (†) 10% level, (††) 5%
level, (†††) 1% level
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TABLE 6. Revealed User preferences: Both Misaligned and Aligned treatments
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Periods 1–9 Periods 2–9 Periods 2–9 Periods 2–9 Periods 3–9
Neg
0.88***
–0.14
–0.11
–0.13
–0.34*
(5.76)
(–0.82)
(–0.59)
(–0.77)
(–1.86)
Pos
0.03
–0.27
–0.41**
–0.26
–0.30*
(0.27)
(–1.44)
(–2.21)
(–1.42)
(–1.44)
Misaligned
0.22*
–1.28***
–1.19*
–1.25***
–1.14***
(1.83)
(–4.48)
(–1.67)
(–4.31)
(–3.05)
Neg Misaligned
–1.35***
–0.43
–0.30
–0.48*
–0.31
(–6.01)
(–1.60)
(–0.98)
(–1.74)
(–1.02)
0.19
0.45*
0.61**
0.43*
0.47*
Pos Misaligned
(0.84)
(1.78)
(2.32)
(1.67)
(1.66)
|Error| Neg
–1.10***
–0.08
–0.14
–0.09
-0.00
(–11.56)
(–0.57)
(–0.88)
(–0.63)
(-0.01)
|Error| Pos
–0.71***
–0.03
–0.04
–0.03
0.00
(–9.49)
(–0.25)
(–0.30)
(–0.28)
(0.07)
|Error| Neg Misaligned
0.54***
0.14
0.16
0.10
–0.01
(4.47)
(0.85)
(0.85)
(0.60)
(0.08)
|Error| Pos Misaligned
–0.02
–0.32**
–0.29**
–0.35**
–0.43***
(–0.24)
(–2.26)
(–1.98)
(–2.46)
(–2.84)
Lag1Neg
–0.20
–0.18
(–1.14)
(–1.07)
Lag1Pos
-0.03
-0.15
(-0.19)
(-0.87)
Lag1Neg Misaligned
-.020
-0.22
(-0.82)
(-0.94)
Lag1Pos Misaligned
0.14
0.27
(0.59)
(1.14)
|Lag1Error| Lag1Neg
–0.09
–0.02
(–0.74)
(–0.17)
|Lag1Error| Lag1Pos
–0.05
–0.02
(–0.60)
(–0.26)
|Lag1Error| Lag1Neg Misaligned
-0.05
0.02
(-0.34)
(0.13)
|Lag1Error| Lag1Pos Misaligned
–0.16
–0.21*
(–1.46)
(–1.77)
Lag2Neg
0.40*
(1.91)
Lag2Pos
0.17
(0.87)
Lag2Neg Misaligned
-0.90***
(-3.44)
Lag2Pos Misaligned
0.02
(0.08)
|Lag2Error| Lag2Neg
-0.25**
(–1.98)
DV = Rank
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|Lag2Error|

Lag2Pos

|Lag2Error|

Lag2Neg

Misaligned

|Lag2Error|

Lag2Pos

Misaligned

Consistency
Consistency

Misaligned

Accuracy
Accuracy

Misaligned

OthersConsistency
OthersConsistency

Misaligned

OthersAccuracy
OthersAccuracy

Misaligned

Fixed effects?
Total Users
Total Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Akaike information criterion
Bayesian information criterion
Wald chi-square

None
96
5,184
–8,739
17,506
17,597
392.16

1.28***
(7.62)
–0.31
(–1.10)
1.55***
(6.20)
–0.59*
(–1.84)
–1.00***
(–4.62)
0.22
(0.69)
–0.73***
(–3.56)
–0.50*
(–1.66)
None
96
4,608
–6,999
14,041
14,183
335.41

1.50***
(8.62)
–0.53
(–1.50)
1.83***
(5.08)
0.34
(0.64)
–1.67***
(–7.52)
0.76*
(1.69)
–1.68***
(–4.05)
–0.97*
(–1.78)
Pair
96
4,608
–5,874
11,882
12,060
.

1.28***
(7.62)
–0.31
(–1.07)
1.54***
(5.65)
–0.76**
(–2.14)
–1.01***
(–4.64)
0.21
(0.64)
–0.75***
(–3.72)
–0.48
(–1.59)
None
96
4,608
–6,986
14,032
14,225
444.79

–0.06
(–0.62)
0.37***
(2.61)
–0.15
(–1.21)
1.78***
(5.34)
–0.68
(–1.49)
1.08***
(2.59)
–0.54
(–0.99)
–1.26***
(–3.40)
0.29
(0.60)
–0.57*
(–1.85)
–0.50
(–1.15)
None
96
4,032
–6,126
12,328
12,568
398.84

Table 6 provides the results for the estimation of equation (2). Each observation reflects data on one User’s ranking
of one Reporter in one given period based upon their history of reporting errors. We utilize a random-effects
ordered logit regression because the dependent variable consists of six ordered categories. Standard errors are
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by User. Columns (1), (2) and (3) test the most recent reporting error, while
Columns (4) and (5) include one and two additional lagged errors, respectively. For brevity, we omit the estimated
constants (i.e., the “cut-points”).
Rank is the ranking position and is inverted so higher numbers reflect a better ranking (so six is the most preferred
Reporter). Neg identifies understatement errors, Pos identifies overstatement errors, and |Error| is the absolute value
of the reporting error. Misaligned identifies pairings in the Misaligned treatment. Consistency is the variance in the
Reporter’s reporting errors multiplied by negative-one. Accuracy is the Reporter’s average absolute reporting error
multiplied by negative-one. OthersConsistency and OthersAccuracy are the average Consistency and Accuracy of
the other five Reporters.
Z-statistics are in brackets underneath each coefficient in Panel A. Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values:
(*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level
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TABLE 7. Tests of hypothesis 2: Users’ dispreference for aggressive reporting is driven by
Reporters’ motives
Panel A. Difference-in-differences: Under- and overstatement errors of equal magnitude by treatment
Fitted values from column (2) of Table 6 H2a
±1
±2
±3
±4
±5
††
(α4 + β3 |Error|) – (α5 + β4 |Error|)
+
–0.41
0.05
0.51*
0.97**
1.43**
[6.17]
[0.08]
[2.74]
[4.17]
[4.85]
Panel B. Difference-in-differences: Incremental understatement and overstatement error by treatment
Differences in coefficients from Table 6
H2b
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
+
0.56***
0.46**
0.46**
0.45**
0.42**
|Error| Neg Misaligned –
[15.19]
[6.51]
[4.49]
[6.57]
[6.04]
|Error| Pos Misaligned
|Lag1Error| Lag1Neg Misaligned –
+
0.11
0.23
|Lag1Error| Lag1Pos Misaligned
[0.49]
[2.42]
|Lag2Error| Lag2Neg Misaligned –
+
0.51***
|Lag2Error| Lag2Pos Misaligned
[11.66]
Panels A and B of Table 7 provide the results for our tests of hypothesis 2, based on the results for the estimation of
equation (2) in Table 6.
Rank = α0 + α1Neg + α2Pos + α3Misaligned + α4Neg Misaligned +
α5Pos Misaligned + β1|Error| Neg + β2|Error| Pos +
β3|Error| Neg Misaligned + β4|Error| Pos Misaligned +
∑βkControls + ∑βkControls Misaligned

(2)

Panel A provides the fitted values from column (2) of Table 6 for the difference-in-differences in the effect of errors
of equal magnitude from ±1 to ±5, shown in each column, and between the Misaligned and Aligned treatments, on
the Reporter’s ranking position. Panel B reports the difference-in-differences in the marginal effect of an
incremental understatement error and overstatement error and between the Misaligned and Aligned treatments, based
on estimates from each column of Table 6, as shown. Columns (4) and (5) include one and two additional lagged
errors, respectively.
Chi-square statistics are in square brackets underneath each coefficient. Significance levels based on two-tailed pvalues: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level. In the direction opposite of prediction: (†) 10% level, (††) 5%
level, (†††) 1% level
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